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ESSAY

Coty, Amazon, and the
Future of Vertical
Restraints:
Evolving Distribution
Norms on Both
Atlantic Shores
BY CHRIS SAGERS

I

N MAKING COMPETITION POLICY WE
dwell on theory to the nearly complete neglect of history, and that is probably to our discredit. Some at least
seem to be doing that as to a recent decision of the
European Court of Justice (CJ), Coty Germany, GmbH
v. Parfümerie Akzente, GmbH,1 and its weighing of problems
in innovative distribution. To simplify a bit, Coty held that in
order to preserve the value of their brands, the makers of “luxury” products could prohibit resales over Amazon or other
third-party online retailers.
To whatever extent some in Europe hope that Coty portends changes favoring an American-style law of distribution,2 they perhaps should be careful what they wish for. The
same theoretical concerns that drive such cases, and the pecuniary or political motivations that may underlie them, quickly left America with no law of vertical restraints at all.
Lawyers tend to imagine cases like Coty as new-ish events,
with significance in a context of recent debate. That is in part
because it involved electronic commerce, and above all because
it involved the online retailer Amazon. But in America at
least, all vertical cases seem to pose what seem like modern
problems, because they invoke the vertical economics first
deployed in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.3 in the
late 1970s. Those economics wield a significance in America
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beyond distribution restraints, because many remember
Sylvania as the celebrated turning point after which U.S.
antitrust became “economic.” 4 Therefore, American lawyers
generally understand Coty-type cases as just further problems
within the vast esoterica of that latter-day economics literature.
But in thinking about Coty, lawyers won’t much bother
with its echoes in, say, the 1930s, or the 1880s, or the rest of
that benighted time before we discovered the purportedly
objective truth, which is to say roughly all of human history
before 1977.
In other words, much discussion of this present period of
rapidly changing distribution, including discussion of Coty
in both America and Europe, is premised on times being
meaningfully new when in fact they are not. Many of those
who claim that times have changed do so to justify legal flexibility to restrain competition, and in particular to restrain
very vigorous retail competitors like Amazon. However,
efforts were made throughout the first half of the 20th century to stop very similar innovations, by the adoption of
trade restraints, trade organization agitation, and protectionist legislation. Those efforts opposed change that in retrospect seems not to have been so bad.5 And so, however new
anything might actually be in the present world of online
commerce, one thing that seems not so new is producers
and distributors trying to stop things that people tried to stop
before.
To be clear, no one seriously doubts that the world has
changed as a consequence of online distribution, in any number of measurable respects. But whether it has changed in ways
relevant to antitrust policy is a different question. On some
level, antagonism between producers and their distributors is
the oldest story in mass-market capitalism, and the fact that
this new period of conflict involves a big technological change
is not even factually distinguishing. Some of the first really
intense distribution-sector conflicts in America first arose
only because rail and telegraph had made mass markets possible. Of course, the mere fact that tension between producers and distributors is the same now as it once was does not
prove that nothing needs correction, through private arrangements or government intervention. Even if things haven’t
really changed, it might just mean that firms really have faced
certain market problems, persistently and across different
markets. However, the history of similar periods suggests
that those seeking legal flexibility now are like those in the
past whose efforts now seem problematic.
The Coty decision itself probably means several different
things within European law, and it has special technical significance within the EU’s intricate vertical restraints rules. It
would simplify improperly to claim that Coty was preoccupied solely with the internet, or even with ongoing debates
within vertical economics. What is interesting, however, is the
general push at present among manufacturers and traditional distributors to protect their interests, which is one reason
Coty is worthy of such keen attention on both sides of the
Atlantic.
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Context: The Law and Politics of Distribution in
Europe and America
While some policy developments at the moment seem similar in Europe and America, there are also surprising legal differences between the two vertical competition regimes.
As under U.S. law, vertical agreements in the EU have
always been subject to Article 101 TFEU, the EU’s general
law on multilateral trade restraints.6 But for that one common fact, however, the two systems diverge pretty far from
one another. Generally speaking, the EU law of vertical
restraints has been stricter than U.S. law, and as American law
has grown more permissive, the divide has grown. The EU’s
rules most surprise American lawyers not for their strictness,
however, but for their elaborate, confusing complexity and
their rigorous formalism. A further difference that American
lawyers may take a little longer to appreciate—because it is
very subtle and shrouded—is that to some extent the systems
serve different purposes.
The EU rules have generated controversy in Europe.7 Even
following substantial relaxation of the once onerous trade
restraints rules generally—by a series of block exemptions
starting in the 1980s 8 and then a major decentralization of
enforcement in 2003 9—the EU’s substantive law of vertical
restraints has remained strict. The EU Commission (EC)
has acknowledged criticism and generally endorsed the contemporary economic orthodoxy that vertical restraints are of
secondary concern.10 One barrier to liberalization, however,
has apparently been the CJ’s skepticism of the EC’s more economic approach, and its determination for now to stick to the
formalism of its own case law.11
Accordingly, EU law still stands as follows: (a) both minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) and a few special categories of non-price restraints are effectively per se illegal,
regardless of any party’s market share, and (b) other nonprice vertical restraints are open to challenge if either the upor downstream participant has more than 30 percent of a relevant market. (Where neither party has 30 percent, nonhardcore restraints are presumed legal.) These rules are implemented through block exemption regulations and a set of
non-binding EC Guidelines,12 and they set out meticulously
defined exceptions with which firms must comply to avoid
significant legal risk. Agreements must be tailored carefully to
these rules, whether they serve the parties’ real business goals
or not. That problem is known by European critics as the
“straightjacket” effect.13
This is pretty different from the U.S. regime. During the
1970s, under the influence of a new and much more conservative economics, and a significant change in Supreme Court
personnel,14 U.S. law began a relaxation that has made vertical restraints very difficult to challenge. Before then the law
was comparatively strict. RPM had been mostly per se illegal
for more than 50 years; exclusive dealing, tying, and some
other non-price vertical restraints were subject to pretty tough
rules of their own; and for a brief and controversial period,
essentially all vertical restraints were made per se illegal.15 But
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beginning with Sylvania in 1977, and in a series of Supreme
Court opinions explicitly invoking the new economic thinking, those tough standards quickly eroded. Though in principle all vertical restraints are still subject to Sherman Act
challenge, and the occasional calls to make them per se legal
have not been answered,16 they have become more or less per
se legal as a practical matter. Even RPM is rarely challenged
except in Maryland and California, the two states where it
remains per se illegal under state law, and even for distribution
there, RPM can be made relatively safe with so-called Colgate
plans. For some decades, accordingly, EU law has constrained
vertical limits quite a bit more than U.S. law, especially since
the federal per se rule against RPM was dropped in Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.17
This divergence between the two systems may be driven
in part by their somewhat different goals. Most importantly,
while EU competition law is just as “economic” as U.S. law,
and now mostly explains itself according to consumer-welfare-oriented price theory, it also serves the distinct goal of
internal market integration.18 Among the specific means by
which free trade is meant to strengthen Europe is the spread
of opportunity and economic benefits among the member
states. Because its members have comparatively small populations, it is thought that those goals are served if they can
enjoy scale advantages throughout the internal market, without barriers at their borders.19 Accordingly, EU law and its
vertical restraints rules in particular are especially concerned
with private restraints that would effectively re-establish
national trade barriers.20 Very strict rules against distribution restraints could make sense given these goals. If manufacturers choose or are pressured to restrict distribution on a
country-by-country basis, it could have an effect similar to
national trade barriers, and firms in the affected states could
lose the scale benefits of freer trade.
For what it may be worth, another theme has had some
influence in EU competition law, and it might explain much
of the rigor and the resistance to Sylvania-style economic
deference to distribution restraints. The law still to some
degree seems based on the individual liberty of downstream
sellers.21 That value has roots in the national laws of some EU
member states 22 and it once explicitly animated U.S. law as
well.23 It is perfectly “economic” in its faith that better market outcomes follow from the independent decision making
of individual businesses. For what it is worth, though, it disfavors restraints that economists now claim to be desirable.24
As for the Coty case itself, it might seem surprising that it
was watched so closely in Europe.25 It was merely the latest
decision within an intricate legal framework that governs
one specific type of vertical restraint. The European courts
had already held that a manufacturer could establish a “selective distribution network” and protect distributors within it
from intrabrand competition, but only in certain circumstances. Such a network must meet a set of technical requirements, known as the “Metro criteria,” after the cases in which
they were devised. Most important in Coty was the Metro

requirement of proper motivation: “the characteristics of the
product in question [must] necessitate such a network in
order to preserve its quality and ensure its proper use.” 26 In
its earliest Metro cases, the CJ found this requirement met for
technological products, which might require skilled instruction or service. Later lower court decisions extended it to
“luxury” items. Coty involved one such product, purportedly “luxurious” perfume. The manufacturer prohibited its distributors from reselling over third-party online platforms,
like Amazon.
Strictly speaking, Coty was only a preliminary advisory ruling to the national courts of Germany, made under a procedure like the certification of questions by U.S. federal courts
to state supreme courts. Moreover, its details are technically
intricate, and hard to generalize in any simple summary. But
the basic holding in essence was to confirm that luxury is a
permissible goal for a selective distribution network, and that
it is sometimes permissible to protect it by prohibiting online
sales through discernible third-party platforms. In other
words, manufacturers can now at least sometimes prohibit
European resale of their goods over Amazon.
Within this approach is another striking difference between the U.S. and EU rules. In Europe the legality of a distribution scheme may depend on metaphysical line drawing
by judges that seems fairly unguided and subjective. At a
minimum, it will produce some odd results. For example, the
CJ has now decided that expensive perfume is a “luxury” item
that can be properly brand-differentiated with restrictive distribution, but just a few years earlier it held that “cosmetics
and body hygiene” products are not.27 Odd results seem
unavoidable because the lines themselves do not reflect traits
inherent in the products. “Luxury” is acknowledged to be an
image-driven and ephemeral phenomenon,28 and one that is
created in part by the very restraints that the product’s luxurious nature is said to justify.29 That is, restraints are permitted to preserve the luxury image that the restraints themselves create. In fact, essentially any retail product can be
differentiated for quality, whether it actually has any quality
advantages at all, even if it has perfect substitutes.30 Consumers, in other words, can be fooled. So, there is no reason a priori that any particular item is not “luxurious” in this sense.
This approach suggests a deeper difference yet between the
two systems. By refusing to entertain such questions, U.S.
policy at least in principle leaves them to markets themselves.
What products should be sold, and how, seem the kinds of
questions that markets usually handle well. The most important paper in the vertical restraints literature, which basically founded the economics on which U.S. law has largely
abandoned vertical enforcement, acknowledged as much.
Economist Lester Telser observed that, except in special circumstances, consumers will pay to have whatever marketing
service or source of information that is desirable to them.31
Therefore, if a producer cannot profitably sell a particular
kind of product, at a particular quality-adjusted price and
with a certain suite of marketing and support services, then

There is a separate reason why Coty seemed so
significant. It is that it involved the inter net, and
above all the powerful distributor Amazon, with its
potential to disr upt traditions, settled investments,
ways of doing business, and social values.

that is usually not an argument for limiting retail competition. It is an argument that the product shouldn’t be sold in
that way or sold at all.
Or at least that is how it should ordinarily be, if Telser’s
view were taken more seriously. The thrust of his paper was
that in some cases, something actually wrong with the market—rather than anything inherent in the nature of the product—might require private restraints to keep price competition from undermining proper distribution. Accordingly,
one might have expected U.S. law to require an actual empirical demonstration of free riding or some other plausible reason that a particular market cannot give consumers what
they want. In principle it does require some such showing,
but as a practical matter, again, that does not actually happen.
In practice there just are not any challenges to vertical
restraints at all.
The question remains why Coty got so much attention.
There are certain technical reasons. For one thing, it reflected the confusion caused by some terse and unexplained language in the 2011 CJ ruling known as Pierre Fabre, which cast
doubt on whether protecting brand image could ever justify
an anticompetitive restraint.32 Coty seems to have resolved
that question.
But there is still intense concern over just what Coty
means, and what its broader consequences will be for e-commerce. Some think it is narrow, and applies only to some
range of “luxury” products with very exclusive brand
images.33 Some think it is broader, and applies to protection
of any branded goods,34 and some others think it is significant well beyond its own specific technical concerns. If it is,
it may render the problem just described—the peculiar metaphysics—academic. It may have already loosened the law
going forward so that in every case there will be essentially the
same case-by-case treatment concerning whether selective
distribution restraints (or platform bans) are permitted, without serious regard to the product’s “luxury” or other nature.
If it works out that way, then the line of cases culminating in
Coty might “suggest that EU law is [now] agnostic about the
business model that companies choose.” 35
There is a separate reason why Coty seemed so significant.
It is that it involved the internet, and above all the powerful
distributor Amazon, with its potential to disrupt traditions,
settled investments, ways of doing business, and social values.
There is accordingly a widely held sense that this new world
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is dangerous, and that legal rules must permit vulnerable
parties to protect themselves, for the good of all. As to that,
there are some lessons in history.
Lessons from the Past and Thoughts
Going Forward
Online distribution looms ominously in antitrust circles, as
one imagines it does in boardrooms and executive suites as
well. Queries from manufacturer clients are common on how
legally to constrain Amazon, and some lawyers have made
niche practices of it. Coty and many other cases in the national and European courts suggest that it is as pressing in Europe
as in America
It also poses a policy tension that is really difficult, and that
turns out to have a long history. Big changes in distribution—
a sector that so directly impacts the nature of employment,
individual opportunity, and the social fabric of communities—are almost unique in competition history for the confusion and acrimony they cause, and the difficulty of dealing
with them through any coherent politics to serve the greater
good.
And again, it is key on both Atlantic shores. Consider
two big, recent policy initiatives: the so-called “Better Deal”
in the United States, a mid-term campaign platform released
by Congressional Democrats in 2017,36 and the EU’s push of
the last several years to establish a “Digital Single Market.” 37
Those two efforts, seemingly so different in their priorities,
goals, and approaches, are actually preoccupied with the
same basic problem, and they struggle with it to the same
unsatisfactory degree. They stress both the magical-seeming
benefits of online distribution and the threat it poses, to settled investment, small business, and social values.
To recognize the conflict is not a criticism. The tension
between marketplace vigor and the other social values to
which it seems hostile is a problem that no one has really
resolved. But it is a problem on which history sheds light. For
the dangers that e-commerce and the powerful online platforms pose are not unique or new. They characterize all periods of technological transition, and probably in none so
acutely as in transitions in distribution.
The tension can be thought of as two related but distinct
problems. On the one hand are the interests of workers,
small entrepreneurs, neighborhoods, aesthetic values, and so
on, which are jeopardized by the insolvencies and changing
business models incident to disruptive change. Those losses
are dear and seem genuine, and though they are probably the
inevitable incidents of capitalism, they must be addressed in
some way by a society that aspires to moral decency and sustainable competition policy. They are not, however, problems
likely to be improved by reducing competition in the way
implied in calls for better or different vertical restraints. That
is treating a real illness with the wrong medicine.
The other problem is how change in distribution affects
business firms themselves. Incumbent firms routinely resist
change through trade restraints and other defensive measures.
1 0 6
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In assessing these firms’ arguments that forestalling change to
protect them is needed for society, history is a useful guide.
We’ve Been Here Before. As it happens, Amazon is not
the first distributor to generate aggressive logistical improvements, the cost savings of which it translated into vicious,
world-changing price competition. It also wasn’t Costco, or
Walmart, or even the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company.
In the United States such things arose at least as early as the
time of the Civil War, when self-service retail shops, multilocation chain stores, and mail order catalog companies first
appeared. New distribution models directly threatened older
ones, and the settled investment they represented. There followed America’s first wide incidence of RPM, and indeed
there arose vigorous, nationally organized movements to establish RPM throughout American retail.38 The foundations of
American vertical relations law were first hammered out during this widespread, long-term struggle.39 It later fueled the
presidential election of 1912, contributed to the antitrust legislation of 1914,40 and drove the Robinson-Patman Act,
Miller-Tydings laws, and state chain-store taxes.41 Newer and
lower-cost distribution has always invited attempts to restrain
it with private collusion and public policy tools.

Online distribution looms ominously in antitr ust
circles, as one imagines it does in boardrooms
and executive suites as well.

It is not at all clear that this exercise has been a useful one.
For one thing, those policy gestures typically have little longterm effect. And whether they do any particular good, it is
pretty clear that they do some harm. Obviously, to the extent
that they keep prices high, consumers suffer. But they might
also deter allocational efficiency improvements in distribution
that are socially critical. As the historian Marc Levinson
pointed out in his history of the Great A&P, before the chain
stores, the food to which most Americans had access was
high cost and low in variety and quality, and most urban
Americans lacked meaningful access to fresh produce.42 The
politics that led to these distribution policies might strike us
now as very strange. For example, people considered it radical and dangerous when stores first allowed consumers to
select their own products from shelves. And finally, it seems
telling enough that it was consumer advocates who ultimately wanted to end RPM. When a new consumer movement arose in the 1960s and 1970s, it took as one major goal
ending the protectionist legislation of the 1930s, like the
Miller-Tydings Act, which was repealed in 1975.
As for the other cost of change, the threat to the pecuniary
interests of incumbent firms, we can probably be less charitable. Unlike the concerns of workers and communities, it is
hard to find any very legitimate defense for distribution
restraints based on the pecuniary interests of producers or

traditional distributors. It really boils down to a struggle
between producers and distributors over their share of whatever surplus they can squeeze out of consumers. That struggle is as old as mass-market capitalism.43
Given this reasoning, it may seem odd that suppliers
should ever disfavor a price-cutting distributor. Other things
equal, a manufacturer should want more price competitiveness downstream, not less. The lower the distributor’s resale
price, the more units will be sold. More units times the manufacturer’s per-unit profit should usually mean more profit
for the manufacturer. So, one might think that manufacturers who want vertical restraints or some other kind of limitation on a firm like Amazon must have some other, procompetitive reason for wanting it.
But indeed, there is a key reason for a manufacturer to fear
aggressive distributors, and it is illustrated very nicely in the
history of past periods of change. The cost-cutting distributor usually takes its gains not from consumers, in the form of
higher price. Rather, it will most often gain power through
expanding market share—which it does through vigorous
retail price-cutting, as well as convenience and customer service—in order to exert more power in wholesale price negotiation. That was the story of the Great A&P, and it appears
also to have been the story of Walmart and the warehouse
retailers. It appears very emphatically to be the story of
Amazon.
If the danger that Amazon poses is just to suppliers’ revenues or their currently settled investments, then we should
be wary when they claim they must preserve “brand identity” or whatever else through some new vertical restraints. If
that really is what is going on in present efforts to preserve
brands online, then what people are trying to stop really just
seems like something people tried to stop before, for reasons
that turned out not to be so wholesome, all to thwart a
change that was not ultimately so bad.
Looking Ahead. For all those reasons, if Coty represents
some progress toward adoption of U.S.-style vertical restraints
law, particularly if it is driven by fear of the social disruption
of distributional innovation, Europe should proceed with
serious caution. On the one hand, the present frustration of
producers and incumbent distributors is definitely understandable. Producers want to preserve distribution networks
they have built with significant effort and investment, and
distributors just want to protect their livelihoods. If vertical
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Pablo Ibañez Colomo, Case C-230/16, Coty Germany GmbH: Common
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Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty in Contrast to U.S. Antitrust, 35 A NTITRUST B ULL .
1009, 1021–22 (1990).
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restraints are illegal, however, they are left with little recourse.
Few producers or distributors at present could stand up to a
firm like Amazon unilaterally, and the law would forbid bargaining with it collectively or defending against it through
group coercion or boycott. The effort of Apple and several
publishers to fix the price of eBooks made that all quite clear,
in both America and Europe.44 Likewise, at least in America,
those seeking a public policy alternative will find themselves
in the same position as American newspapers, which presently are in a very uphill struggle for statutory permission to bargain collectively over ad revenues with Google and Facebook.45
This just begs a deeper question. While the interests of
those pushing for more freedom to restrain distribution in
Europe are plain, what they seek is really just to protect the
pecuniary interest of quite a limited number of people. It will
retard innovation that could help many others, and meanwhile do nothing obviously useful to deal with the larger
social threats that a firm like Amazon might actually pose.
The American experience should therefore caution against
loosening up the law just to solve these problems. In the
U.S., the adoption of the underlying theory generated legal
changes that proceeded very quickly, and permitted the characterization of any retail-level price competitiveness as potentially dangerous and anti-social. Relatively quickly, there
came to be effectively no American law of vertical restraints
at all.
An alternative may be to reconceive the “problem” of disruptive change in distribution, which so preoccupies lawyers
and regulators in America and Europe, as not a problem at all,
or at least not the right problem. Logistical or technological
innovation is a highly desirable and perhaps indispensable
good. If it generates genuine human losses—as opposed to
mere change in individual firms’ leverage in wholesale price
negotiations—they should be met with policy tools that actually treat them. They should not be addressed by reductions
in competition, which will not fix them and will just cause
other problems. And to whatever extent Amazon in fact causes anticompetitive harms, that too is a call for more competition, not less. It may very well be that Amazon has done
more than just price aggressively. But if it has engaged in
exclusionary abuses to get its big market shares, the right
response is monopolization challenge, not restraints to protect
its distributor competitors. 䡵
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